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Introduction to Economics as a Public Science 
Harro Maas*, Steven G. Medema**, and Marco Guidi***	 
 
This short article introduces readers to the papers published in this issue 
on the theme of “public reason” in economics. It provides ground to the 
notion of “public reason” in economics as a two-way process taking place 
in interstitial spaces between economics, as an academic discipline, and 
the various publics in which economics—its concepts, tools, and         
methods—acquires meaning as an instrument of social understanding and 
political change. 
Keywords: methodology, public reason, expertise 
Introduction à l’économie comme science publique 
Ce court article sert d’introduction aux articles publiés dans ce numéro sur 
le thème de la « raison publique » en économie. Il précise la notion de 
« raison publique » en économie comme un processus à double sens qui 
s’inscrit dans les espaces interstitiels entre l’économie comme discipline et 
les publics variés parmi lesquels ses concepts, outils et méthodes acquiè-
rent une signification comme instrument de la compréhension sociale et 
du changement politique. 
Mots-clés : méthodologie, raison publique, expertise 




The essays in this and the next issue of Œconomia are the result of a 
conference on “Economics and Public Reason,” which was hosted by 
the Centre Walras-Pareto for the History of Economic and Political 
Thought at the University of Lausanne in early May 2018. After the 
conference, the papers were rewritten in the light of the conference’s 
discussion and sent out for peer-review. In the end, fourteen papers 
were retained that will be published in this and the next issue, guest-
edited by Harro Maas of the Centre Walras-Pareto, Steven Medema of 
the Center for the History of Political Economy at Duke University, 
and Marco Guidi of the University of Pisa. Before briefly introducing 
the papers of this issue, the guest-editors would like to thank the    
editorial board of Œconomia, but especially Jean-Sébastian Lenfant, 
                                                            
*Centre Walras-Pareto for the History of Economic and Political Thought, 
University of Lausanne, harro.maas@unil.ch 
**Department of Economics, Duke University, steven.medema@duke.edu 
***Department of Economics, University of Pisa, marco.guidi@UNIPI.IT 
202 Harro Maas, Steven G. Medema, and Marco Guidi | 
Œconomia – Histoire | Épistémologie | Philosophie, 9(2) : 201-207 
Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche, Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay and 
François Allisson and, of course, the contributors, without whom the-
se symposium issues would not be possible. Thanks also go to the 
Swiss National Science Foundation (grant nr. IZSEZ0_180388) and the 
University of Lausanne’s Institute of Political Studies for their finan-
cial support. 
The call for papers articulated the relation between economics and 
public reason as a two-way process, in which economics as a disci-
pline developed its forms of argument and evidence in exchange with 
its publics. The call also emphasized our interest in contributions that 
would take specific sites, textual genres, formal and informal net-
works, or profiles of specific categories of mediators as point of de-
parture. It was not our intention, as some might take “public reason,” 
to investigate the relation of economics to the specific liberal demo-
cratic context encroached by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas in 
their respective analyses of how such a liberal democratic order could 
or should be conceived.1 Instead, we used the label “public reason” to 
loosely refer to the interstitial spaces between economics, as an  aca-
demic discipline, and the various publics in which economics—its 
concepts, tools, and methods—becomes meaningful. We therefore 
conceived of our subject rather as a reference to Sheila Jasanoff’s col-
lection of essays, Science and Public Reason (Jasanoff, 2012; see also 
2009), in which Jasanoff develops the idea of science, not as a purely 
academic enterprise, but as an endeavor which develops in exchange 
with its publics. To make clear the nature and scope of our enterprise, 
we have elected to employ the title, “economics as a public science” 
for these two thematic issues of Œconomia.  
Nowadays, it is of course a commonplace to say that public and 
policy discourse is immersed in economic terminology and reasoning. 
Scholarly writing within the history of economics, and in recent years 
increasingly from economic sociologists and science and technology 
studies, has detailed the role of economists as expert advisors and 
public intellectuals (Mata and Medema, 2013), their role in politics 
(Guidi, 2017), individually or as part of groups and networks (Forget 
and Goodwin, 2011), from Roosevelt’s Braintrusters (Barber, 1988; 
1996) to the New Economics of the Sixties (Bernstein, 2001; Romani, 
2018), to the Mont Pelerin Society and the rise of neo-liberalism 
(Mirowski and Plehwe, 2015). In their excellent review of recent 
scholarship in this field, Hirschman and Berman (2014) made the use-
ful distinction between economists and economics. They noted that 
the influence of economists on public and policy discourse may reside 
far less in their direct pronouncements than in what Science and 
Technology Studies refers to as the socio-technical infrastructures of 
                                                            1 The literature is too vast to reference here, but see for example Rawls (1997); 
Benhabib (1991). 
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economic knowledge production and transmission. These studies do 
not concentrate on individual economists or networks but look at 
what Hirschman and Berman capture under the labels of styles of rea-
soning and policy devices that provide specific economic knowledge 
and produce its force and persuasiveness. Both notions have their 
own complex histories and connotations, but for present purposes 
they usefully distinguish between the core principles with which 
questions of economic policy are approached and the “sociotechnical” 
tools put in place to “help policymakers see and make decisions 
about the world” in specific ways.2 
The contributions in this first special issue thus center around 
questions of the economist’s ethos and his or her tools and modes of 
persuasion, while those in the second take up the (international) insti-
tutional settings within which economic concepts, tools and theories 
became and become expressed. The distinction is one of degree rather 
than kind, because inevitably there are many crossovers between the 
distinctions just made, as is easily seen from the attention that will be 
paid to the political institutional settings in this volume as well.  
The question of the economist’s ethos is perhaps most visible in 
the contribution by Andrés Alvarez, Andrés Guiot-Isaac, Jimena Hur-
tado. They raise the issue of the neutrality or non-neutrality of eco-
nomic expert advice against the diverging perspectives of Albert 
Hirschman and Lauchlin Currie on the role of the economic expert 
and the possibilities and limits of expert advice on economic devel-
opment. While both were concerned with the patchwork approach to 
economic planning which they experienced during their consulting 
work in Colombia, they took opposing messages from this, with their 
respective positions premised on their divergent perspectives on the 
interplay between “sound economic principles” and the force of local 
circumstances. While Currie was a believer in both sound principles 
and the need to adapt them to local circumstances, Hirschman was 
more sceptical about the existence of any such principles. Instead, he 
saw the economic expert as a mediator and catalyst whose judgment 
could enhance initiatives on the ground, but who by no means could 
enforce a consistent and encompassing development plan (something 
Currie perhaps ideally might have wished for, but deemed not possi-
ble in an imperfect world). Both perspectives thus suggest different 
roles to play by economists, embodying different attitudes toward the 
different audiences with whom they engage.   
The economist’s ethos is important in Arthur Cecil Pigou’s reflec-
tions on and practice as an economist in the public sphere as well. 
Pigou has commonly been considered an academic recluse, certainly 
                                                            2 Hirschman and Berman thus cut the cake rather differently from the vast litera-
ture on (economic) modeling that considers modeling itself as a style of reasoning 
that should be added to Alistair Crombie’s original list. For a discussion, see es-
pecially Morgan (2012). 
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in comparison with his much more vocal contemporaries such as John 
Maynard Keynes. But as Nahid Aslanbeigui and Guy Oakes detail, 
“public enlightenment” in correct principles of economic reasoning 
was a project of lifelong concern to Pigou, one for which he mobilized 
the support of his fellow economists when he deemed it necessary. 
Prominent here was his initiative in the early 1930s to publish a letter, 
signed by a wide list of economists (but not covering the whole spec-
trum of opinions) setting out the economists’ arguments against 
Chamberlin’s austerity policies. The initiative illustrates Pigou’s ab-
horrence of “partisanship” but also his naïveté in assuming the possi-
bility of a neutral vantage point from which economists could lecture 
politicians and the general public about a sphere of economic reason-
ing that could be distinguished from political parti-pris. Pigou articu-
lated an ethos of neutrality which effectively functioned, as 
Aslanbeigui and Oakes show, as an epistemological trap; economic 
policy prescriptions are inconceivable without being political. 
Pigou argued his position against a belief in the self-correcting 
power of markets, and hence the belief that involuntary unemploy-
ment would only be temporary. That such a belief has material con-
sequences as to how economists perform their research can be seen in 
the opposing positions of the Wisconsin institutionalists and Robert 
Lucas, discussed by Marianne Johnson and Aurélien Goutsmedt, 
Danielle Guizzo and Francesco Sergi, respectively. The Wisconsin in-
stitutionalists took as a consequence of their belief in the malfunction-
ing of markets, and especially labor markets, the need to pursue a re-
search agenda that was useful to diagnose market shortcomings and 
intervene by creating an institutional environment to correct them. 
This not only implied a heavy emphasis on legal reform, but also an 
educational commitment to show and tell the facts and the reforms 
needed.  
The result was a research agenda that focused on particulars, con-
ducted time and again using difficult and time-consuming (partici-
pant) field work, instead of an agenda that generalized its findings. 
For Robert Lucas, at the other end of the spectrum, such an activist 
agenda was anathema. His strong belief in self-correcting markets 
made it important to create an institutional environment that would 
prevent governments from actively intervening in the economy. This 
is why he strongly criticized the Employment Act of 1946, which in-
stitutionalized an activist government in the marketplace. One vehicle 
for this activism was the newly formed Council of Economic Advi-
sors. Indeed, Lucas blamed the Employment Act of 1946 for legitimiz-
ing government activism instead of institutionalizing governmental 
restraint. To put it bluntly, if you don’t believe in self-correcting mar-
kets, you have to put institutions in place that correct them. That’s 
exactly what Wisconsin institutionalists did with their agenda of ac-
tion research and legal reform. If you do believe in self-correcting 
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markets, you have to put institutions in place that prevent the gov-
ernment from intervening in them. This is what Lucas and Buchan-
an’s constitutionalist approach to economic policy tried to achieve. As 
Goudsmedt et al. show, the “high theory” approach to macro-
economics developed by Lucas and others was never neutral with 
regard to economic policy. Instead, their general approach to macro-
economic modeling incorporated a “passive” view on economic poli-
cy which from the outset intended to constrain government activism.  
The paper in which Lucas articulated his famous “Lucas critique” 
and which he had distributed strategically in the right venues, was a 
manifestation of this overarching concern. It provides a nice illustra-
tion of Hirschman and Berman’s point that economists sometimes can 
be more effective indirectly by framing a policy agenda than through 
direct, concrete policy interference. In Lucas’ case, the irony, of 
course, was that his notion of passive politics became hailed by the 
medium he deliberately tried to steer away from: journalism and the 
daily press.  
The story told by Goudsmedt et al. is complemented in this vol-
ume with an account of the nemesis of Lucas’s approach to econom-
ics: The New Economics of the 1960s that self-consciously took the 
possibilities of fine tuning the economy to the extreme. As Béatrice 
Cherrier shows, Walter Heller was New Economics incarnate. Cher-
rier concentrates on Heller’s most effective weapon in changing poli-
tics, one that in its form and execution was the radical opposite of 
high theory: the memo to the President. Cherrier’s detailed account of 
Heller’s crafting of his memos, and the important place they gained in 
policy preparation, shows them to be genuine policy devices that help 
policymakers to make economically informed decisions (Hirschman 
and Berman, 2014, 782). But her contribution also points to the im-
portant role played by institutional infrastructures. Heller’s memos 
could never have had such an important influence on the decisions of 
the American president were it not for the existence of the recently 
created Council of Economic Advisors (as rightly seen by Lucas), a 
system that gives substantial discretionary power to the President, a 
particular President willing to discuss and trying to understand eco-
nomic policy matters, and the interventionist style of economic rea-
soning of the New Economics that generically backed up Heller’s ar-
guments. 
The importance of this setting becomes clear when contrasted with 
the very different institutional structure for macro-economic policy 
that evolved in the Netherlands after the Second World War. As Tom 
Kayzel argues, the so-called Dutch Central Planning Bureau gained 
its present overwhelming authoritative voice on questions of macro-
economic policy when it adjusted its macro-modeling approach away 
from mere forecasting to the design of “railway timetables” that com-
pared the consequences of different economic policies in one compre-
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hensive table, thus enabling politicians to discuss forecasting out-
comes while black-boxing the economic model that produced them. 
But just as the memos to the President lost their patina once Heller 
and the New Economics were no longer there, so did the comparative 
policy tables produced by the Dutch CPB once it tried to take on 
board the medium- and long-term effects of technical change. That 
model produced policy alternatives that were substantially reduced 
in scope and, paradoxically, it was only by mobilizing the political 
domain as an ally against the substantial resistance to the new CPB 
modeling coming from within the academic realm that the CPB was 
able to regain and even increase its political authority.  
These last contributions thus show the contingencies that make 
economic styles of reasoning, policy devices and socio-technical infra-
structures sufficiently aligned to be effective. Sometimes, however, 
the necessary alignment never occurs, as a result of which potentially 
influential ideas fail to gain traction. This was the case in the applied 
field of port economics, where marginal cost pricing, as in Pirandel-
lo’s famous piece, was waiting for an audience that would pick up on 
its importance. That audience only came when ports were no longer 
only considered within the context of national economic politics, as a 
question of national interest, but instead had moved into the sphere 
of the European Union and became considered in terms of legitimate 
competition and economic efficiency. When ports were no longer 
seen as public utilities and lost their public goods character, they be-
came ‘economized’ in terms of marginal cost pricing. But this did not 
happen without the transfer of decision-making authority to the Eu-
ropean Union, which provides our final reminder, to be followed up 
in the next issue, that it is not only the economist’s perception of his 
or her role in the public sphere which matters. The institutional set-
ting in which an economist provides public policy pronouncements is 
equally important.  
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